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Article 4

Against Supercompensation: A Proposed
Limitation on the Land Buyer's Right To
Elect Between Damages and Specific
Performance as a Remedy for Breach of
Contract
Jonathan Levy*

I.

INTRODUCTION

The commentary on contract remedies is replete with arguments over
whether specific performance is or is not efficient, and whether it
should or should not be adopted as the default remedy for breach. What
the commentary lacks, however, is the recognition that nowhere in
American jurisprudence is specific performance the sole option
available to a promisee. Wherever specific performance is available,
the default remedy of expectation damages, calculated as of the date of
breach, is also available. Thus, it is this choice among the remedies that
should be evaluated for its efficiency, not the remedies individually. I
will argue that giving promisees the choice between expectation
damages and specific performance is, for transactions that take place in
time-variant markets, an inherently supercompensatory and, therefore,
inefficient remedy.
In most cases of breach of contract, the promisee-plaintiff1 must
settle for monetary damages. The court will estimate, subject to a
variety of limiting doctrines, the dollar-value that the promisor* Jonathan Levy, Associate at Sandals & Associates, P.C.; J.D. New York University School
of Law 2002, B.A. University of Arizona 1999, B.S. University of Arizona 1999; Delaware
Supreme Court law clerk 2002-2003. The author would like to thank the editorial staff of the
Loyola University Chicago Law Journal, Professor Barry Adler, Justice Carolyn Berger, Alan
Sandals, and Suzanne Meiners.
1. For reasons addressed below (see infra note 8 and accompanying text), this Article focuses
solely on breaches committed by contract promisors, not promisees. Nonetheless, many of the
points raised have relevance for promisee breaches.
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defendant's performance would have had to the promisee.2 This
estimation generally is made by starting with the "market or use value"
of the performance3 at the time of the breach, 4 and then capitalizing that
amount from the time of breach until the judgment, according to a
5
predetermined interest rate.
But when a promisor-seller breaches a contract for the sale of land,
the promisee-buyer has the option to sue for either monetary damages or
specific performance of the contract. 6 If the promisee elects specific
performance, the court will order the promisor to perform as per the
terms of the contract 7-thus furnishing the promisee with the value of
performance as of the date of execution of the judgment. This ability to
elect among remedies gives the promisee who contracts in a volatile
market the power to wait and watch the market before filing her claim.
If a rising market drives up the value of performance, the promisee can
choose specific performance and receive the value of performance at the
time of judgment. If, on the other hand, the market declines, she may
sue for damages and receive the value as calculated based upon the
market price at the time of breach. The promisee who follows this
strategy is able to reap the benefit of a rising market without bearing the
risk that the market may fall.
Thus, the choice between two
compensatory remedies becomes, in fact, a supercompensatory remedy.
2. 3 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 12.8, at 188-89 (2d ed. 1998)
(noting that the contract plaintiff "is-entitled to recover an amount that will put one in as good a
position as one would have been in had the contract been performed"); see also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 344 (1981) (defining the promisee's expectation interest); Thomas
A. Diamond & Howard Foss, Consequential Damages for Commercial Loss: An Alternative to
Hadley v. Baxendale, 63 FORDHAM L. REv. 665, 678 (1994) ("An important principle of contract
damages is to protect the aggrieved party's expectation interest by putting that party in the same
position as though the contract had been performed.").
3. Jeffrey Standen, The Fallacy of Full Compensation, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 145, 150 (1995)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
4. 3 FARNSWORTH, supra note 2, § 12.1, at 148 (noting that in setting the damage amount,
"the circumstances at the time for performance, rather than those at the time of making the
contract, are determinative"); Larry A. DiMatteo, A Theory of Efficient Penalty: Eliminating the
Law of Liquidated Damages, 38 AM. Bus. L.J. 633, 698 (2001) ("Full compensation under
American law is often viewed as the difference between the contract price and the market price at
the time of breach or between the contract price and the price of substituted goods (normally as
limited by the market price at the time of substitution).").
5. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 354; see also Am. Computer Inst. Inc. v. State,
995 P.2d 647, 656 (Alaska 2000) (explaining the purpose of awarding prejudgment interest).
6. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 360 cmt. e; 3 FARNSWORTH, supra note 2,
§ 12.6, at 179; Kevin C. Kennedy, Equitable Remedies and PrincipledDiscretion: The Michigan
Experience, 74 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 609, 628 (1997); Anthony T. Kronman, Specific
Performance, 45 U. CHI. L. REv. 351, 355 (1978) (contracts for the sale of land are "[t]ypical
situations" where "courts are prepared to order specific performance").
7. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 357 cmt. a.
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My analysis will focus for two reasons on the breach-of-contract case
wherein a seller has breached a sale-of-land contract. First, unlike in
other breach-of-contract cases, plaintiff buyers in breached land-sale
contracts have a per se right to elect between specific performance and
damages; 8 second, the land market is time-sensitive, as it experiences
well-documented swings within relatively short periods of time.
In Part II, I will flesh out the argument that the election between
specific performance and monetary damages results, on average, in
compensation to the plaintiff in an amount greater than her expectation.
In Part III, I shall present a series of economic arguments intended to
show the inefficiency of remedies that provide compensation above
expectation-remedies that I shall refer to as "supercompensatory."
These arguments will be followed, in Part IV, by a broad analysis of the
scholarship and doctrine of contract remedies, which will show, first,
the great lengths that courts go to prevent supercompensation in other
contexts, and second, that the courts have no similar aversion to
compensation less than expectation. Finally, in Part V, I shall propose a
solution to the problem of supercompensation through the opportunistic
election between specific performance and expectation damages.

II.

THE PROBLEM: THE PLAINTIFF'S ABILITY To DELAY
ELECTION BETWEEN DAMAGES AND SPECIFIC
PERFORMANCE RESULTS IN SUPERCOMPENSATION

For four hundred years, monetary damages measured in terms of the
promisee's expectation have been the dominant remedy in breach of
contract cases 9 and expectation remains "'the basic principle for the
measurement of [contract] damages." ' 10
Under the expectation

8. See, e.g., James E. Leahy, Land Contracts Revisited, 69 N. DAK. L. REV. 515, 524, 526-27
(1993) (stating that "[a] vendor requesting specific performance must overcome several
obstacles," discussing these obstacles, and noting that breached-against land vendees generally
are granted specific performance as long as they are not guilty of "'over-reaching,' 'unfairness,'
and 'sharp practices."'); Standen, supra note 3, at 224 ("[H]istorically most jurisdictions
protected such sentimental values in regard to land, to the point at which specific performance of
land contracts and constructive trusts, a restitutionary device, were routinely imposed for
conversions of real property." (footnotes omitted)).
9. 3 FARNSWORTH, supra note 2, § 12.20a, at 338 ("The preeminence of the expectation
principle as a basis for awarding damages in breach of contract goes back to the sixteenth
century.").
10. Michael B. Kelly, The Phantom Reliance Interest in Contract Damages, 1992 Wis. L.

REV. 1755, 1756 (alteration in original) (quoting 3 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS
§ 12.8 (1990)); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 344 cmt. a ("Ordinarily,
when a court concludes that there has been a breach of contract, it enforces the broken promise by
protecting the expectation that the injured party had when he made the contract. It does this by
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measure, courts seek to award damages sufficient to put the plaintiff in
"as good a position" as she would be in if the contract had been
performed. 11 Although, theoretically, expectation damages include

idiosyncratic preferences,

12

in practice, they generally are "measured in

13
terms of the market or 'use' value of the damaged interests."
Once a court has determined the market value of the plaintiffs loss at
the date of breach, 14 that amount is often capitalized according to a

predetermined interest rate, to account for lost investment opportunity
15
during the time elapsed between the breach and the final judgment.
The applicable interest rate varies by jurisdiction. In cases where
federal law applies, but the rate is not set by statute, courts have applied
the federal government rate on short-term, risk-free obligations. 16 In

some jurisdictions, the rate may be somewhat higher. For example, an
Alaskan statute sets the rate at "three percentage points above the 12th
Federal Reserve District discount rate in effect on January 2 of the year

in which the judgment ...is entered." 17 In either case, prejudgment

interest is intended "merely [to] compensate the plaintiff for being

denied the opportunity to invest and earn interest on the amount of
damages" and "is not intended to punish the defendant's
' 18
misbehavior."
In cases where the breached contract was for the purchase or sale of
land, plaintiffs, in addition to having a right to recover expectation
damages, also have the option to receive specific performance of the
attempting to put him in as good a position as he would have been in had the contract been
performed ... ").
11. 3 FARNSWORTH, supra note 2, § 12.8, at 188-89 (The contract plaintiff "is entitled to
recover an amount that will put one in as good a position as one would have been in had the
contract been performed"); see also Diamond & Foss, supra note 2, at 678 (discussing the
principles of contract damages).
12. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 344 cmt. b.
13. Standen, supra note 3, at 150.
14. 3 FARNSWORTH, supra note 2, § 12.1, at 148 (explaining that factors "at the time for
performance, rather than those at the time of making the contract," determine the damage
amount); see also Anthony D'Amato, Post-revolutionary Law and Economics: A Foreword to the
Symposium, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 757, 763 (1992) (pointing out that if a seller breaches and sells
the performance to a newly discovered alternative buyer at a higher price, then the seller is not
liable for that higher amount in a suit for breach).
15. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 354; see also Am. Computer Inst. Inc. v.
State, 995 P.2d 647 (Alaska 2000) (explaining the purpose of prejudgment interest).
16. See, e.g., McCramm v. U.S. Lines, 803 F.2d 771 (2d Cir. 1986) (applying the average
interest rate paid on six-month U.S. treasury bills); ITT World Communications v. W. Union
Tele., 598 F. Supp. 1435 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (applying the average interest rate paid on six-month
U.S. treasury bills).
17. ALASKA STAT. § 09.30.070(a) (2002).
18. Matthews v. DeSoto, 721 S.W.2d 286, 287 (Tex. 1986).
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contract. 19 This doctrine of treating contracts for the sale of land
differently is derived from the special status afforded to land by English
courts, 20 which "viewed [land] ...with particular esteem" such that
"[e]ach parcel, however ordinary, was considered unique." 2 ' This
special treatment of land has crossed the Atlantic and carried through to
the present day, leading the writers of the Second Restatement of
Contractsto comment:
Contracts for the sale of land have traditionally been accorded a
special place in the law of specific performance. A specific tract of
land has long been regarded as unique and impossible of duplication
by the use of any amount of money. Damages have therefore been
regarded as inadequate to enforce a duty to transfer an interest in land
to a third person .. 22
Once a contract plaintiff wins a suit for specific performance, the
23
court will order the defendant to "render the promised performance,"
with the aim of producing "as nearly as practicable the same effect that
the performance due under a contract would have produced." 2" Thus,
[a]t least in theory, specific performance and damages are simply two
means of accomplishing the same result. Specific performance
protects the plaintiff's expectation interest in a contract by delivering
the promised performance[, while expectation] damages ...protect
the same interest [by] forcing the defendant to pay the monetary
25
equivalent of the promised performance.
Standing alone, both monetary damages and specific performance
serve to compensate a plaintiff according to her lost expectations. But
as soon as the plaintiff receives the option to elect between the two
remedies, the aggregate effect tends toward supercompensation.
In Semelhago v. Paramadevan,2 6 for example, the Canadian Supreme
Court faced squarely the supercompensatory nature of election between
19. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 360 cmt. e; 3 FARNSWORTH, supra note 2,
§ 12.6; Kennedy, supra note 6, at 628; Leahy, supra note 8, at 527-28.
20. 3 FARNSWORTH, supra note 2, § 12.4, at 159-64; Robert Stack, A Revised Remedy:
Trends and Tendencies in the Law of Specific Performance Since Semelhago v. Paramadevan, 6
APPEAL 60, 62 (2000) (Can.).
21. 3 FARNSWORTH, supra note 2, § 12.6, at 174-75.
22. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 360 cmt. e.
23. 3 FARNSWORTH, supra note 2, § 12.5, at 165.
24. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 357 cmt. a.
25. Emily L. Sherwin, Law and Equity in Contract Enforcement, 50 MD. L. REV. 253, 260
(1991); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 359 cmt. a (noting that both specific
performance and monetary damages address the expectation interest).
26. Semelhago v. Paramadevan [1996] 2 S.C.R. 415, 419 (Can.), available at http://
www.lexum.umontreal.ca/csc-scc/en/pub/1996/vol2/html/1996scr2_0415.html
(last visited Jan.
23, 2004).
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damages and specific performance. Semelhago had entered into a
contract with Paramadevan to purchase a home. 2 7 Paramadevan
breached this contract and the land market soared.28 Semelhago sued,
electing based on a statutory entitlement 29 to receive damages in lieu of
specific performance, amounting to the value of the land as of the time
of the trial. 30 However, in the time that elapsed between the breach and
the trial, the value of the property at issue had risen from a contract
price of $205,000 to $325,000.31 Semelhago was allowed to recover for
32
the $120,000 post-breach increase in the property's value,
notwithstanding that (1) he clearly was not emotionally attached to the
property in such a way that pecuniary compensation would have been
insufficient-after all, he affirmatively elected to receive money rather
than the actual land 33-and (2) if the land market had dropped instead
of risen, he could, at least under the Second Restatement of Contracts
rule, 34 just as easily have elected to receive expectation damages, thus
avoiding the market loss by taking compensation based on breach-date
valuation.
The ability to reap supercompensation through election between
expectation damages and specific performance arises from two factors.
First, specific performance gives the value of performance as of the date
of judgment while expectation damages gives it as of the date of breach.
Second, the doctrine of election of remedies gives plaintiffs the
flexibility to wait and watch the market before choosing which remedy
to pursue. The Second Restatement of Contracts section on election of
remedies, in keeping with the general trend against preclusion by
election, 3 5 articulates the election rule as follows:
If a party has more than one remedy [available, then her]
manifestation of a choice of one of them by bringing suit or otherwise
is not a bar to another remedy unless the remedies are inconsistent and

27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O., ch. C-43, § 99 (1990) (Can.) ("A court that has jurisdiction
to... order specific performance may award damages in addition to, or in substitution for,
the.., specific performance.").
30. Semelhago, [1996] 2 S.C.R. at419.
31. Id. (giving amounts in Canadian dollars).
32. Id. at 427. However, so troubled was the Canada Supreme Court by this result that it
prospectively abolished the rule that specific performance is per se available in cases of breach of
land-sale contracts and held that "[slpecific performance [of land-sale contracts] should not be
granted as a matter of course absent evidence that the property is unique." Id. at 428-29.
33. Id. at 419-20.
34. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 378 cmt. a (1981).
35. See id. at 227 introductory cmt.
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the other party materially changes [her] position in reliance on the
36
manifestation.
The election need not "be made within any particular time," and "a
change in remedy may often be made by amendment of the complaint,
even at an advanced stage of the action." 3 7 This degree of flexibility is
reflected in a line of cases in which courts have found consistently that
post-breach increases in land value do not, in and of themselves, nullify
the plaintiff's right to specific performance. 38 This leniency in allowing
plaintiffs to elect their remedy has led to a "standard practice" for those
pursuing suits for specific performance "to include in the pleadings an
39
alternative claim for damages."
The plaintiff's freedom to choose to receive her expectation either
measured at the date of judgment (i.e., specific performance) or
measured at the date of breach (i.e., damages adjusted for interest) gives
her "a lottery ticket that [by the time she is forced to elect] may already
have shown itself to be a winner." 40 Such a choice allows her to "reap
where [she] has not sown" 4 1 by gaining returns from an increasing
market without bearing any risk that the market should fall.
Having demonstrated the supercompensatory nature of election
between specific performance and damages, in Parts III and IV, I shall
argue against supercompensatory remedies in general, and in Part V, I
shall propose a solution to the problem of supercompensation in the
context of actions for breach of land-sale contracts.
III. ECONOMIC CRITICISMS OF SUPERCOMPENSATION
As recent scholarship demonstrates, economic analysis has been
unable to conceive of a single perfect damage measure that "induces
both sides to behave efficiently on a variety of dimensions both before
(ex ante) and after (ex post) a potential breach. ' 42 Indeed, different
contracts between different parties "emphasize different policies,
[rendering] a single, invariable standard of liability ... inappropriate. ' 43
36. Id. § 378.
37. Id. § 378 cmt. a.
38. For a detailed review of this line of cases, see W.E. Shipley, Annotation, Change of
Conditions After Execution of Contract or Option for Sale of Real Property as Affecting Right to
Specific Performance, 11 A.L.R. 2d 390, § 6 (1950).
39. Donald H. Clark, "Will That Be Performance... or Cash?": Semelhago v. Paramadevan
and the Notion of Equivalence, 37 ALTA. L. REV. 589, 603 (1999).
40. Stack, supra note 20, at 69.
41. Buffalo Coal & Coke Co. v. Vance, 76 S.E. 177, 179 (W. Va. 1908).
42. Ian Ayres & Kristin Madison, Threatening Inefficient Perfonnance of Injunctions and
Contracts, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 45, 87 (1999).
43. Diamond & Foss, supra note 2, at 693.
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This Part argues that although the optimal damage remedy may in some
cases fall below the injured party's expectation, in no case will it fall
above this amount.
The analysis will be an economic one, and as such will deal with
minimizing the transaction costs involved in engaging in promissory
exchange. 44 According to the assumptions of economics, transaction
and information costs are the sole barriers to achieving an efficient
distribution of resources.
In their absence, contracting parties
automatically would know all of their contracting options, instantly
enter into all and only the best options, and costlessly negotiate so that
45
each contract takes place on efficient terms.
In the real world, however, transaction costs are nonzero, meaning
that in some cases parties will fail to enter into efficient contracts
because transaction costs are prohibitively high.4 6
The primary
deterrent effect of these additional costs is on potential contracts that
promise only limited profits for either side-i.e., situations where
positive gains from trade are possible, but the gains would be low
enough that transaction costs prevent the contracts from being
worthwhile.
Thus, a goal of contract law can be conceived as the determination of
what contract terms parties would agree to if negotiations were costless,
and then the establishment of default rules that mirror such terms. 4 7 By
pursuing this goal, the law can render aspects of the negotiation
unnecessary, thereby decreasing average negotiation costs and
enhancing welfare through (1) increasing the total number of
promissory exchanges by decreasing the number of potentially valueadding transactions that go unrealized because transaction costs
outweigh potential gains, and (2) increasing, on average, the profits that
44. Sherwin, supra note 25, at 280 (arguing that law and economics scholars "are not
concerned with the ultimate distribution of gains resulting from an efficient breach between
parties; they care only about the transaction costs of negotiation").

45. See Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Principle of Hadley v. Baxendale, 80 CAL. L. REV. 563,
572-77 (1992).
46. Alan Schwartz, The Myth That Promisees Prefer Supracompensatory Remedies: An
Analysis of Contractingfor Damages Measures, 100 YALE L.J. 369, 377 (1990) ("When...
bargain[ing] is costly, the parties sometimes may not agree although positive gains from trade

exist.").
47. See, e.g., Kronman, supra note 6, at 368-69 (arguing in favor of the uniqueness test for
entitlement to specific performance on the basis that it diminishes pre-contracting negotiation
costs); see also Ayres & Madison, supra note 42, at 46-47 (arguing that due to their costs,
renegotiations are "presumptively inefficient"); cf Sherwin, supra note 25, at 278-79 (stating that
because contracting parties generally are able to negotiate out of inefficient legal default rules,
such as the availability of specific performance and damages, the "real impact" of such rules is
their "effect on the transaction costs of collateral negotiation").
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result from those contracts that would be entered into even if further
negotiation were necessary by reducing the costs of negotiation.
Because I am concerned only with contract remedies, the analysis shall
focus on transaction costs relating to "negotiating ...sanctions for
breach. 4 8 In particular, the discussion shall focus on (1) the
precontracting costs of negotiating a damage remedy that provides an
optimal allocation of risk between the parties, (2) the need for the
contract to be sufficiently flexible to allow the parties to react efficiently
to the emergence of an alternative buyer, and (3) the precontracting
information-gathering costs to the promisee incurred in obtaining
information before entering a given contract.
A. Risk Allocation: SupercompensatoryRemedies MisallocateRisk
One of the fundamental roles of contracts is to allocate risk between
parties. 4 9 One driving force that motivates parties as they sculpt the
terms of any contract is the desire to minimize joint risk. The following
analysis will show that supercompensatory remedies fail to minimize
transaction costs relating to the negotiation of a proper risk allocation
because supercompensation necessarily misallocates risk.
In general, people are risk adverse. 50 In other words, every person
has a utility function with two characteristics: (1) as the person's level
of resources increases, her utility (that is, her happiness) also increases,
and (2) the higher a person's level of resources rises, the less utility she
receives from the next additional unit of resources. Figure 1 shows the
general shape of utility functions with these characteristics.

48. Sherwin, supra note 25, at 279.
49. See Diamond & Foss, supra note 2, at 690-91 ("[I]n formulating the default rule for
consequential economic damages it is appropriate to consider how the parties, bargaining
reasonably, would allocate risk with respect to those damages." (footnotes omitted)); DiMatteo,
supra note 4, at 684 (noting that contract terms that allocate risk should be enforced strictly);
Kelly, supra note 10, at 1772 ("The expectation interest permits the parties to allocate risks
among themselves and enforces that allocation.").
50. Schwartz, supra note 46, at 392.
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Figure 1. The general shape of a utility
function.
In order to emphasize the impact of damage remedies on risk
allocation, I will, for the moment, assume the probability of breach to be
exogenous. In other words, neither the buyer nor the seller can invest in
diminishing the likelihood that the contract will be breached. In legal
terms, this can be phrased as a focus on non-willful breaches, breaches
where the breaching party may desire to perform fully but is prohibited
from doing so. An example would be a contractor who contracts to
construct a building, but who learns only after entering the contract that
the soil at the designated spot is incapable of supporting the planned
structure. In Part III.B, these arguments will be generalized to cover
willful breaches.
Suppose that B, the buyer, contracts to buy something from S, the
seller. 5 1 Assuming (1) zero litigation costs, 52 (2) zero judicial error, and
(3) no partial breach, S and B will have expected utilities from the
contract equal to
E(UB) = L(UB (e - p)) + (1 - L)(UB (d - r)),
E(U

s

) = L(Us (p - c)) + (1- L)(U s (-d - c)),

51. This analysis will consider only breaches by the seller.
52. For a thoughtful discussion of this assumption, see Schwartz, supra note 46, at 395-403.
Even if this assumption were eliminated, there is no reason to believe that litigation costs have a
different effect in cases involving breaches of land-sale contracts than in cases involving other
Thus, litigation costs cannot provide an explanation for why greater
types of breach.
compensation is afforded in land-sale cases than in other cases.
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where (1) E(n) denotes the expected value of n, (2) Ui (n) denotes the
utility that individual i would have if she possessed n resources, (3) L
denotes the probability that the contract will be performed, (4) p denotes
the contract price, (5) e denotes the buyer's expected benefit from
performance, (6) d denotes the damage remedy, (7) r denotes the
buyer's cost of reliance on the contract in the case of breach, and (8) c
denotes the seller's cost of the performance, which for convenience I
have assumed to be incurred both in cases of breach and in cases of
performance, an assumption that has no substantive effect on the
calculation. Naturally, e > p, otherwise the buyer would have no
incentive to enter into the contract.
To simplify these expected utility formulae, it is possible to define
two more functions, RB and Rs , the buyer's and seller's "risk loss,"
respectively, such that,
E(UB)

=

UB

(L(e - p) + (1 - L)(d - r)) - RB,

E(U s ) = U s (L(p - c) + (1 - L)(-d - c)) - R s .
Figures 2 and 3 tell this story graphically, with Q, representing the
difference to person n, measured in money, between performance and
breach. For convenience, the zero point on the horizontal axis has been
defined as the amount of money the party had before entering into the
contract.
..

u

Breachi
Point.

Performance
'Point

7R.

UB

Figure 2. The buyer's utility from a contract.
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U
IPrerforance;
"Point

Breach"
Point..
E(Us)

(c-d)

(p-c)
LQ s

Figure 3. The seller's utility from a contract.

For a contract to allocate risk efficiently, it must be the case that p
and d cannot be adjusted in such a way as to increase both E(U s ) and
E(UB). Otherwise, in a world of zero negotiation costs, the parties
would bargain, changing d and p until no mutually beneficial alteration
in the contract terms was possible. Often, one party will be able to bear
risk at a lower cost (with less reduction in her utility) than the other can,
and the parties will agree upon a price and damage remedy combination
that reflects this fact.
Expressed in terms of Figures 2 and 3, as the damage remedy
increases, the buyer's outcome in the case of breach moves to the right,
and the seller's moves to the left. Similarly, an increase in price moves
the buyer's performance point to the left and the seller's performance
point to the right.
The parties' negotiations will aim to diminish joint risk. The party
who can bear the risk more easily will tolerate her breach and
performance points moving farther apart in order to allow the other
party's points to move closer together.
In the domain where
d < (e + r -p), an increase in d moves the buyer's points closer together
and the seller's points farther apart. When d = (e + r - p), the
expectation measure of damages, the buyer's breach point and
performance point overlap; the buyer experiences no risk. Any
additional increase in d will cause the buyer's points to cross. The
buyer will prefer breach over performance. But as soon as the buyer's
points cross, the buyer again begins bearing risk. Any increase of d
above (e + r - p) causes both parties to bear additional risk. This means
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efficient risk-spreading
that supercompensatory damages cannot be an
53
adverse.
risk
are
parties
the
as
long
as
solution
At the other side of the spectrum, a decrease in d causes the seller's
breach point to move to the right and the buyer's to move to the left.
When d = - p, the seller's breach and performance points overlap. Any
movement of d below - p causes the seller's points to cross and both
parties to bear more risk. Thus, the ideal risk-spreading damage remedy
necessarily falls somewhere between - p and (e + r - p).
B. Where Damage Remedy Shapes Breach Decisions,Parties Will
Strictly Preferthe Expectation Measure to Supercompensation
In the last Part, I considered only non-willful breaches. In practice,
however, the decision whether to breach is often entirely under the
control of the breaching party. In this Part, I will focus on the effect of
supercompensatory remedies on breach decisions in cases where the
promisor has the option whether to breach or to perform.
1. The Concept of Efficient Breach
From legal and economic perspectives, the mere fact that a contract
has been entered into does not necessarily mean that it should be
performed.54 Contract law should aim to "encourage efficiency in
individual affairs so as to maximize social wealth. '5 5 This can be
accomplished only by establishing rules that facilitate the movement of
resources to their highest-valued uses. When a promisor who has
already entered a contract to provide certain resources to a promisee is
approached by another potential buyer who values those resources more
highly than the promisee and is willing to pay more than the contract
price, performance of the contract becomes inefficient "in the
straightforward sense that the cost of performance [including
opportunity cost] is greater than the benefit." 56 The world will be better
off if, at the end of the day, the resources are in the hands of the second
buyer, and worse off if they are in the hands of the first. The "ultimate
distribution of gains" resulting from the transaction is incidental; 5 7 all

53.

For an analytical proof of this argument, see infra app. 1; see also Schwartz, supra note

46, at 396 (presenting a related analysis).
54. Standen, supra note 3, at 151 ("[T]he law's predilection for the 'expectation' measure of
damages, and its general rejection of more protective remedies such as specific performance,
suggests that breaches of contract are not only tolerated but are apparently encouraged under
appropriate economic conditions.").
55. Sherwin, supra note 25, at 268.
56. Ayres & Madison, supra note 42, at 47.
57. Sherwin, supra note 25, at 280.
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that matters is the post-breach level of total social welfare, which will,
on average, be maximized if the resources go to the individual willing to
pay the highest price for them. 5 8 "It is [therefore] not in the public
interest to deter breaches that are efficient ... because society benefits
when the seller's economic gains from breach exceed the buyer's
losses." 59 Thus, "the desired incidence of contractual... harms is not
zero," 60 and breach deterrence "is a term of some refinement,6 1connoting
a vision of the social good that favors wealth maximization."
A great body of scholarship exists elaborating the advantages of the
expectation measure for shaping breach decisions. Whenever the
damage remedy is greater than (e - p), there will be cases in which the
promisor has an incentive to perform, even though performance is
inefficient. 62 The expectation measure, however, does not have this
disadvantage, in that it induces performance in all and only those cases
where performance is efficient. 63 Rather than track this total social
58. Law and economics scholars often simplify this statement and claim that welfare will be
maximized per se-not merely on average-by adopting the view that the "only meaningful
measure of value is what people are willing to pay." Id. at 268.
59. Diamond & Foss, supra note 2, at 680.
60. Standen, supra note 3, at 152.
61. Id.
62. See DiMatteo, supra note 4, at 676 (explaining the induction of inefficient performance);
Schwartz, supra note 46, at 375 ("The greater are the damages that the promisor must pay on
breach, the more often will the promisor choose to perform (at a loss) rather than pay."); John A.
Sebert, Jr., Punitive and Nonpecuniary Damages in Actions Based upon Contract: Toward
Achieving the Objective of Full Compensation, 33 UCLA L. REV. 1565, 1572 (1986).
Overcompensation of plaintiff and punishment of defendant for breach of contract, it is
asserted, may produce an economically inefficient allocation of resources. If the
defendant, despite being under contract to the plaintiff, can shift his resources to a
more valuable use, the defendant should not be prevented from doing so as long as he
fully and effectively compensates the plaintiff for her losses.
Id.; Jeffrey V. Coopersmith, Comment, Refocusing Liquidated Damages Law for Real Estate
Contracts: Returning to the Historical Roots of the Penalty Doctrine, 39 EMORY L.J. 267, 269
(1990) ("[A] punitive liquidated damages provision would create an inefficient resource
allocation by, in effect, forcing the performing party to continue to engage in the less valuable
alternative.").
63. See Eisenberg, supra note 45, at 573-74 ("The attraction of expectation damages is that
they place on the breaching party the loss of the other party's share of the contract's value, and
thereby sweep that loss into each party's self-interested calculus in a decision whether to perform
or to breach."); Sebert, supra note 62, at 1572; Sherwin, supra note 25, at 278.
One tenet of economic analysis in contract law is that breach is sometimes more
efficient than performance, and efficient breach should be encouraged. Specifically,
breach is efficient if the promisor can realize a net gain in the form of higher profits or
saved costs by refusing to perform and applying the resources performance would
command to another use. As long as the damage measure compensates the promisee
for the lost value of her bargain, the choice to breach is efficient because it allows the
resources to be applied to a higher-valued use.
Id. (footnotes omitted); Standen, supra note 3, at 151 ("Damages based on harm engender
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welfare perspective, the analysis in this Part will focus, as in Part III.A,
on determining what contract terms the parties would agree to if
negotiation of the contract were costless.
2. Parties Engaged in Costless Negotiation Would Not Agree upon
Supercompensatory Damages
The economic model here is similar to the preceding one. The
players are the same: B, the buyer, and S,the seller. Here, however, the
seller's decision to breach is shaped by the damage measure, which is
set by the bargaining that occurs between the parties before entering the
contract. This analysis will seek to demonstrate that, even when the
damage measure has the potential to alter the seller's decision whether
to breach, parties engaged in costless negotiation would never bargain
for a supercompensatory remedy.
As in the last section, p denotes the contract price, e denotes the
buyer's expectation, d denotes the damage measure, and c denotes the
seller's cost of performance. 64 However, in this instance, a second form
of "cost" is introduced, the opportunity cost, denoted c,. In this
analysis, the opportunity cost represents a second offer from a new
potential buyer. I will assume that co > e because otherwise the second
offer would never lead the seller to breach, given that the remedy is set
at or above expectation. Because it does not represent out-of-pocket
expenditure, opportunity cost is not added to the analysis as an element
of c. 65 Rather, c, represents an additional benefit that can be reaped
either by S if S breaches or by B if B resells S's performance to the
alternative buyer.

theoretically sufficient deterrence by ensuring that no breach of contract or other risk-causing
activity is undertaken where the defendant's expected damages exceeds the expected gains."); see
also Coopersmith, supra note 62, at 269.
Today, the theory characterized as "efficient breach" may be used to explain the
prohibition on liquidated damages as penalties. Under this theory of contract law, a
party to a contract has the choice of either performing or paying damages. The nonbreaching party is presumably indifferent to whether he receives performance or the
monetary equivalent of performance. However, because the breaching party has the
opportunity to use his resources in pursuit of a better alternative, the world is generally
better off.
Id. (citing Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 462 (1897)).
64. For the sake of simplicity, this model will not consider the buyer's reliance. This
omission has no substantive effect.
65. Although it would produce the same analytical result, the addition of opportunity cost as
an element of c would not comport with the graphic utility representation introduced in Part M.A.
This is true because, presumably, knowledge of a missed opportunity does not diminish utility as
dramatically as corresponding out-of-pocket loss.
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For the purposes of this model, when parties at the precontracting
stage bargain for the damage measure, they are, in fact, bargaining over
what happens in the event that the seller receives a second offer that
may tempt her to breach. Assuming that (1) the seller will breach if and
only if she receives a greater expected return from doing so, and (2) c is
known to the seller from before the formation of the contract, the seller
would never breach and the damage remedy would never be invoked
unless a third party put forth a second offer.
Once the seller receives a second offer, 66 there are four possible
outcomes for the contract: (1) the seller performs anyway, after which
the buyer retains the performance; (2) the seller performs anyway, after
which the buyer resells to the alternative buyer; (3) the seller first
negotiates her way out of the contract by paying a price to the buyer for
a release and then sells to the alternative buyer; or (4) the seller
breaches and accepts the second offer. I will show that, if any one of
these four cases were the certain outcome, the seller would ex ante
prefer expectation damages more strongly than the buyer would prefer
supercompensatory damages. It will then follow that, even though the
outcome is actually uncertain, the seller will be willing to trade more in
ex ante bargaining for the freedom to breach efficiently than the buyer
will be willing to trade for the chance to extract additional gains from
the occurrence of a second offer. Thus, in a world of zero negotiation
costs, where the parties bargain until no additional change in. the
contract terms would increase their happiness, the parties would never
negotiate to a supercompensatory remedy.
When damages equal expectation, only one of the four outcomes is
possible. Once S receives a second offer such that co > e, S will
always breach and pay damages to B. 6 7 B's outcome will be (e - p), and
S's will be (c. - c - e + p).68 When the damage measure is greater
than expectation, however, any of the four outcomes are possible. I will
examine each in turn.
In the case of simple performance, S performs notwithstanding the
second offer, and B does not resell to the second buyer. Performance
will only take place in cases where, although C, > e, the cost to S of
extricating herself from the contract (either by negotiating a release or
by breaching and paying damages) is high enough that there is no way
66. I will assume the probability of S receiving a second offer to be exogenous, beyond the
control of either party.
67. This Part assumes that, at the time of S's decision whether to breach, S knows the value
of e.
68. Naturally, S will choose this outcome over her performance outcome of (p - c) because
c. > e.
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for S to take advantage of the presence of the second offer. In this
outcome, B receives a payoff of (e - p), and S receives (p - c). Thus, B
receives the same outcome that she would have received under the
expectation damages measure, while S receives a worse, one. Therefore,
if, given the supercompensatory remedy, performance were the certain
consequence of a second offer greater than e, S would prefer the
expectation measure more strongly than B would prefer
supercompensation.
In the case of performance followed by resale, S performs and
receives the payoff (p - c). B then turns around and sells the
performance-assuming that this is possible-to the alternative buyer at
price co . B receives a payoff of (co-p - T), where T denotes the
additional transaction cost of B getting in contact with the alternative
buyer and executing the second exchange. 69 In this condition, B
receives a surplus of (c. - e - T) more than the (e - p) that she would
have received if the damage measure had been set at expectation. In
comparison, S would have received (co - c - e + p) under the
expectation measure, but under the supercompensatory measure
receives only (p - c), which is less than her expectation return by
(c o - e). Thus, as long as T > 0, S prefers the expectation measure
more strongly than B prefers the supercompensatory measure. Parties in
a costless-negotiation world would, therefore, not select a
supercompensatory remedy if resale by the buyer were the certain
consequence of a second offer higher than the buyer's expectation.
In the case of negotiated exit, S engages in renegotiation with B and
obtains a release from the contract by paying B a sum, Z. B receives an
outcome of (Z -NB), where NB denotes B's cost of negotiating S's
release from the contract. 70 This amount is (Z - NB - e + p) more than
B would have received under the expectation measure. S receives a
payoff of (c o - c - Z - N s ) , where N s denotes the cost to the seller of
negotiating the release.7 1 This amount is (Z + N s - e + p) less than S
69. It seems rational to assume that, on average, the cost to the buyer of arranging a substitute
transaction will be larger than the seller's cost of simply following an opportunity that has already
presented itself. Thus, the insertion of the T term is justified.
70. See Sherwin, supra note 25, at 279-80 (noting a similar negotiation cost example);
Edward Yorio, In Defense of Money Damagesfor Breach of Contract,82 COLUM. L. REv. 1365,
1381-82 (1982) (noting that negotiation to escape a claim for specific performance is costly).
71. Because each side will attempt to negotiate a release on advantageous terms, it is likely
that these negotiation costs will be quite high. See William S. Dodge, The Case for Punitive
Damages in Contracts, 48 DuKE L.J. 629, 665 (1999) ("The potential transaction costs of the
additional negotiation are quite high [in cases where] there is a 'bilateral monopoly' [meaning
that] neither party has an alternative to dealing with the other and each may act strategically to
obtain a larger share of the gain from the second transaction." (footnotes omitted)); Richard A.
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would have received under the expectation measure. Because the
variables involved are all positive, Z + Ns- e + p > Z - NB - e + p.
Thus, S's losses as a result of the supercompensatory damage measure
are greater than B's gains. Therefore, if negotiated exit were the certain
outcome of a second offer, S would prefer the expectation measure more
72
strongly than B would prefer the supercompensatory measure.
The last condition to consider is the condition where S is not deterred
by the supercompensatory damage measure but breaches the contract
and sells to the alternative buyer anyway. S has to pay the
supercompensatory damage measure to B, but c. is high enough that
breach is still her best option. This is exactly the scenario evaluated in
Part III.A. The damage measure is supercompensatory but has no effect
on S's behavior: breach is the sure consequence of S receiving a second
offer; therefore, the probability of breach is independent of the damage
measure. As shown above, in this case, B earns more from breach than
from performance, but in order to contract for the supercompensatory
remedy, B must have paid a price increase equal to more than the
remedy was worth to B. When the damage measure does not shape
breach
decisions,
risk-spreading
concerns
dominate,
and
supercompensatory measures have already been shown to intrinsically
misallocate risk.

Posner, The Strangest Attack Yet on Law and Economics, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 933, 936 (1992)
(noting that, although "in a frictionless world" (i.e., a world with, inter alia, zero negotiation
costs) a default remedy of specific performance would never deter efficient breaches, "[i]n the
real world" negotiation of a contractual release "runs into the problem of bilateral monopoly,"
which creates the risk of high negotiation costs).
72. It may seem strange to assume a world of zero negotiation costs at the contract-formation
stage, but then consider the costs of the later negotiation to be nonzero. In fact, evaluating the
later negotiation costs is appropriate in light of the underlying principles behind the negotiationcost approach. A legitimate goal of contract law is to, as much as possible, make negotiation at
the formation stage unnecessary by setting default rules that approximate the terms the parties
would arrive at if they had unlimited time and energy to expend on negotiating and drafting the
contract. Modeling a world where both the initial negotiation cost and the renegotiation cost are
zero would do contracting parties in the real world only limited service in terms of decreasing
their need to expend resources forming contracts. Real world contracting parties will insert
contract terms to limit their negotiation costs in the future, and default rules intended to decrease
overall negotiation costs must account for this. Thus, the free-negotiation principal applies only
to the specific transaction for which default rules are evaluated. In the real world, of course,
negotiation is costly-particularly renegotiation for release from a contract, a condition of
bilateral monopoly. See Ayres & Madison, supra note 42, at 54-55, 57 (explaining that
renegotiation of terms under conditions of bi-lateral monopoly is inefficient); Yorio, supra note
70, at 1381-82 (arguing that a negotiation to escape a claim for specific performance is costly);
Timothy J. Muris, Comment, The Costs of Freely Granting Specific Peformance, 1982 DUKE
L.J. 1053, 1059 (1982) (showing an example of how negotiations over a buyer's right to specific
performance can become expensive).
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Thus, if any one of the four outcomes analyzed in this Part were the
certain outcome, then the parties would prefer the expectation measure
over a supercompensatory remedy. It follows that, whatever the actual
distribution of probabilities among the four outcomes, the parties in ex
ante bargaining will choose expectation over supercompensation,
though not necessarily over undercompensation, regardless of the effect
of the damage remedy on breach decisions.
C. Promisee'sInformation Cost
In addition to distributing risk and shaping breach incentives, the
damage measure also has potential benefits regarding the promisee's
ability to cost-effectively gather information about the contract before
entering into it. Particular damage measures have the advantage of
making unnecessary some of the promisee's precontracting,
information-gathering expenditures, while causing other of these
expenditures to yield greater return. 73 In the following analysis, I shall
first give a general approach for determining which damage measures
have these benefits and, second, argue generally that no
supercompensatory damage measure has informational benefits as great
as those of the expectation measure. 74 Specifically, I will show that
allowing supercompensation through election between specific
performance and damages has particularly undesirable informational
effects.
1. The Information-cost Principle as Applied to the Expectation
and Reliance Measures
As in the model in Part II.A, the buyer's (B's) expected utility from a
contract is
E(UB) = L(UB (e - p)) + (1- L)(UB (d - r))
= U. (L(e - p) + (1 - L)(d - r)) - RB.
In this model, however, B has imperfect information. From her
perspective, her expectation (e), her reliance (r), and the seller's
probability of performance (L) are all uncertain. 75 The damage remedy

73. Clearly, at the pre-contracting stage the promisee bears the majority of the cost of
gathering information. The promisor is in a better position to know exactly what she intends to
sell to the promisee, whereas the promisee usually has to expend resources to determine what she
is getting. For this reason, the analysis will focus on the promisee's cost.
74. See infra appendix 2 for an example of this information-cost model applied.
75. In practice, uncertainty as to these variables is the rule, not the exception. Buyers are
often unsure as to the quality of the items they contract to purchase, which impacts e. Their
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76
(d) also may be uncertain depending on how it is defined doctrinally.
I will denote the uncertainty of a variable (n) as u(n). B's risk loss
becomes a function of, among other things, the uncertainties of all of
the variables
that factor into her utility function (i.e.,
RB = RB(u(e),u(d),u(r),u(L).... )).
As any of these uncertainties
increase, so too does B's risk loss.
I will assume further that B may have opportunities to invest in
reducing some of the relevant uncertainties, thereby reducing her risk.
For most damage remedies, she must distribute her spending widely on
seeking to diminish-for the purposes of the present model-as many
as four uncertainties. 77 Certain damage measures, however, cause the
number of variables affecting B's expected utility (the "degrees of
freedom" of the function) to decline. This allows B to ignore certain
variables in her precontracting information gathering. In addition, as
the number of variables upon which RB depends declines, RB's
average sensitivity to movement in the remaining degrees of freedom
must increase.
Therefore, decreasing the number of relevant
uncertainties makes gathering information about the remaining
uncertainties more cost-effective. This, in turn, increases B's valuation
of the contract and makes B willing to pay a higher price to S.
The reliance measure of damages presents a clear-cut example of a
damage measure that diminishes the number of relevant uncertainties.
When d = r, the buyer's expected utility equation simplifies to the
following:

E(UB)

=

UB (L(e - p) + (1 - L)(r - r)) - RB

= LUB (e -

p)

-

RB (u(e), u(L),...).

By using r as the damage measure, both r and d drop out of B's
expected utility equation, thereby eliminating the need for B to invest in
reliance often depends upon uncertain events taking place between the formation and execution of
the contract. And, of course, the probability that the seller will breach is almost always uncertain.
76. A particularly relevant example of an uncertain damage measure is the ability to elect
between expectation damages and specific performance, a remedy that depends on postcontracting and post-breach market fluctuations.
77. The model could easily be generalized to include more than four uncertainties. For
example, the present model assumes litigation costs to be negligible. By eliminating this
assumption, and recognizing that litigation costs are likely to be uncertain, it would be possible to
generalize this model to take into account the impact that various legal rules would have on the
level of uncertainty associated with litigation costs. Such an analysis may demonstrate the
desirability of simple legal rules which minimize this particular uncertainty. Indeed, the model is
ripe for expansion to include additional variables as elements of B's utility function and,
therefore, as new possible sources of risk. However, for the present purposes, four uncertainties
are enough. Expansion would merely complicate matters.
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reducing u(r) and u(d). As will be shown, the information-cost
advantages of the reliance measure are not as great as those of the
expectation measure. However, as Part III.A implied, in some cases the
reliance measure will possess risk-spreading advantages over
expectation such that, in situations where the ideal risk-spreading
solution is close to the reliance measure, the informational
considerations may make reliance the optimal remedy.
Unlike the reliance measure, the expectation measure allows B to
ignore S's probability of breach. When d = (e + r - p),
E(UB)

= UB

(L(e - p) + (1- L)(d - r)) - RB

= UB (L(e - p) + (1 - L)(e + r - p - r)) - RB
=UB((e-p)(L+l-L))-RB =UB(e-p)-RB(u(e),...).
Thus, the only variables that affect B's expected utility become e and p.
Because p is assumed to be certain, the expectation measure allows B to
devote all of her information-seeking resources to decreasing u(e).
2. Implications for Various Supercompensatory Damage Measures
Unlike the expectation measure, no supercompensatory damage
measure allows B to ignore S's probability of breach. By definition, a
supercompensatory damage measure is one in which (e - p) < (d - r).
When this is the case, L will not drop out of B's expected utility
function. Moreover, outside of the bizarre solution where L equals zero,
e will never drop out of B's expected utility function. Thus, no
supercompensatory damage measure will reduce the number of
uncertainties upon which E(UB) depends as dramatically as will the
expectation measure.
Nonetheless, if, for public policy reasons, a court or legislature were
to impose a supercompensatory damage measure on a party in breach,
the information-cost model suggests that some supercompensatory
measures would be better than others. Treble damages, for example,
have advantages over awards of expectation damages plus attorney's
fees. Under treble damages,
d = 3(e - p + r),
E(UB) = UB(L(e- p) + (1- L)(3e - 3p)) - RB(u(e),u(L),...).
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If A denotes the amount of attorney's fees, which are presumably
uncertain, then under an expectation plus attorney's fees measure,

d = e - p + A + r,
E(UB) = U(L(e - p) + (1 - L)(e + A)) - RB (u(e), u(L), u(A)...).
While the treble damages measure uses only variables that already
exist in B's expected utility, adding attorney's fees adds a new variable,
and thus a new uncertainty. This same logic demonstrates that allowing
supercompensation by opportunistic election between specific
performance and damages is a particularly bad way to award
supercompensation because it forces B to consider highly uncertain
future movements in the land market.
IV.

EXPECTATION AS A CEILING IN SCHOLARSHIP AND

DOCTRINE

The preceding economic analysis argues that courts should seek to
adopt a scheme of contract remedies such that some plaintiffs receive
their full expectation, while other plaintiffs receive less than their
expectation, but no plaintiffs receive more than their expectation. In
this Part, I will show that courts and scholars follow this scheme almost
exactly. In order to demonstrate that supercompensation through
opportunistic election between specific performance and damages is
truly the odd remedy out, I will first discuss those scholars who have
advanced the theory that the default damage measure should be set
below expectation. 78 Second, I will turn to contract doctrine and show
that courts generally set expectation as the ceiling for recovery, but
subtract from that amount whenever other policy considerations can be
furthered by so doing. 79 Finally, I will discuss the contract doctrines of
punitive and liquidated damages to show that courts go to great lengths
to avoid awarding supercompensation. 80 It will be clear that, as the
economic models predict, courts do not use other policy considerations
to justify upward adjustments of recovery as freely as they do to justify
downward adjustments.
A. Fullerand Perdue
In 1936, in a publication revered as "the most influential piece of
contract scholarship [of the twentieth] century," Fuller and Perdue
"revolutionized the way scholars thought about contract damages" by

78.
79.
80.

See infra Part IV.A.
See infra Part IV.B.
See infra Part IV.C.
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advocating a framework that used reliance as the basis for calculating
contract damages. 8 ' In The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages,8 2
they discussed three possible interests that contract remedies could be
shaped to protect: the restitution interest, the reliance interest, and the
expectation interest. 83 Remedially fulfilling the reliance interest, the
central concept of their theory, 84 required "award[ing] damages to the
plaintiff for the purpose of undoing the harm which his reliance on the
defendant's promise has caused him." 85 In other words, under reliance
damages, the monetary award should be sufficient to "place the plaintiff
in as good a position as she would have occupied if no promise had
been made" 86 -that is, the position she would have been in had the
contract never been formed. 87 In the major exception to this rule, Fuller
and Perdue argue to limit reliance at expectation: "[W]e will not in a
suit for reimbursement for losses incurred in reliance on a contract
knowingly put the plaintiff in a better position than he would have
occupied had the contract been fully performed. 8 8 This means that a
court should choose the lesser of reliance and expectation so that,
regardless of breach, the plaintiff must "bear any losses that she would
89
have suffered had the [contract been] performed.
In many cases, the reliance interest will be the least of Fuller and
Perdue's proposed possible interests (viz., their reliance measure is
always less than or equal to expectation and frequently less than
restitution). Fuller and Perdue saw expectation as overly generous,
"'compensat[ing]' the plaintiff by giving him something he never
had," 90 and argued that courts should use the expectation remedy only
as a shorthand, because reliance (which Fuller and Perdue argued

81. Kelly, supra note 10, at 1755, 1757.
82. L.L. Fuller & William R. Perdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages: 1, 46
YALE L.J. 52 (1936).
83. Id. at 53-54.
84. Id. at 53.
85. Id. at 54.
86. Kelly, supra note 10, at 1773 (examining Fuller and Perdue's The Reliance Interest in
Contract Damages).
87. Id. at 1761 (discussing The Reliance Interest in ContractDamages).
88. Fuller & Perdue, supra note 82, at 79 (emphasis omitted).
89. Kelly, supra note 10, at 1763 ("Fuller and Perdue... rejected any application of the
reliance interest that would produce a recovery larger than the expectation interest. The
expectation interest imposed a cap on the amount of recovery, thus forcing the plaintiff to bear
any losses she would have suffered had the defendant performed." (footnotes omitted)).
90. Fuller & Perdue, supra note 82, at 53.
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should include the value of lost opportunities) 9 1 presents terrific
difficulties of proof. 92 In this view, the reliance interest provides the
"normative justification" for recovery, 93 and "damage awards [such as

expectation] that permit[] the plaintiff to recover profit merely use[]
profit as a proxy for the gains prevented because one party, in reliance
on a promise, elected to forego other opportunities that would have
produced similar profit."-94 The expectation measure simply provides
the easiest way to make sure that reliance is protected, and reliance must
be protected, it is argued, because without such a degree of protection,
parties would be unwilling to engage in promissory exchange. 9 5 96Thus,

in order to protect reliance, "we must ...dispense with its proof."-

The noteworthy praise that the reliance measure has drawn-for
example from Professor DiMatteo espousing that "'[contractual] justice
requires nothing more than compensation measured by the amount of
harm suffered,"' 97 and from other scholars urging courts to award
reliance damages more frequently 9 8-reflects an intuitive understanding
91.

Id. at 55.
[T]hough reliance ordinarily results in "losses" of an affirmative nature (expenditures
of labor and money) it is also true that opportunities for gain may be foregone in
reliance on a promise. Hence the reliance interest must be interpreted as at least
potentially covering "gains prevented" as well as "losses caused."

Id.
92. Eisenberg, supra note 45, at 575 ("Reliance... is often difficult to prove."); Fuller &
Perdue, supra note 82, at 62 ("The difficulties in proving reliance and subjecting it to pecuniary
measurement are such that the business man knowing, or sensing, that these obstacles stood in the
way of judicial relief would hesitate to rely on a promise in any case where the legal sanction was
of significance to him.").
93. Kelly, supra note 10, at 1756 (discussing Fuller and Perdue's The Reliance Interest in
Contract Damages).
94. Id.
95. See Eisenberg, supra note 45, at 575 ("There would be little incentive to make contracts if
costs resulting from the other party's breach were not compensable. Therefore, the minimum
damage measure to which contracting parties would normally agree is a reliance or cost measure,
based on the parties' baseline reliance interests."); Sherwin, supra note 25, at 293-94 ("Legal
protection against losses incurred in reliance on a contract serves commercial policies that are
vital to our society ....).
96. Fuller & Perdue, supra note 82, at 62.
97. DiMatteo, supra note 4, at 643 (quoting Professor Corbin in his work, ARTHUR CORBIN,
CONTRACTS § 1057 (rev. ed. 1993)).
98. See, e.g., Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Enforcing Promises:An Examinationof the
Basis of Contract,89 YALE L.J. 1261, 1291 n.61 (1980) ("Three critical insights can be extracted
from Fuller's exploration of the remedial and formal structures of contract: first, reliance is the
organizing principle that supports all contractual obligation ....); Mark Pettit, Jr., Private
Advantage and Public Power: Reexamining the Expectation and Reliance Interests in Contract
Damages, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 417, 418 (1987).
This Article concludes that all the arguments that have been offered to justify the
expectation principle independently of reliance protection are unpersuasive .... Unless
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of the importance of risk spreading. Although, from an economic
perspective, reliance produces less efficient incentives with respect to
the breach decision than expectation does, reliance will tend to better
spread risk in cases of parties with similar levels of risk aversion (see
figure 4).99
U

U

Qs

Q,

A

A
E(UB)*

(e-p)
LQ,
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(Cr)
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Figure 4. Under the reliance measure, the buyer's utility in the case of breach is
equal to her precontracting utility. This means that, unlike under the expectation
measure, the buyer bears some risk. The seller, on the other hand, bears less risk
because d = r and r < (e + r).

B. DoctrinalLimitations on Recovering Full Expectation
In addition to the occasional use of the reliance measure of damages,
the jurisprudence of contract remedies is rife with other limitations on
plaintiffs' ability to recover full expectation. The apparent "fear of
overcompensating contract plaintiffs" 1°° has led to comments like the
following from Professor Farnsworth, who stated, "All in all, our
system of legal remedies for breach of contract, heavily influenced by
the economic philosophy of free enterprise, has shown a marked
it can be shown that protecting the expectation interest will make us richer or more just
or more free, we should stop after we have protected the reliance interest.
Id. But see Kelly, supra note 10, at 1787 ("Reliance limited by expectation imposes upon
contract damages an asymmetry systematically skewed to favor the breaching party."). The
reliance measure is, in fact, infrequently applied. Id. at 1758 ("Despite scholarly acclaim, the
reliance interest plays virtually no role in the calculation of damages in contract cases.").
99. This risk-spreading advantage occurs because, due to the downward curvature of utility
functions, as a party's breach and performance points move farther apart, the marginal risk loss
for each additional increase in separation increases. As a result, when parties have similar levels
of risk aversion, ideal risk spreading will often require that both parties bear some risk.
100. Sebert, supra note 62, at 1571.
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solicitude for men who do not keep their promises."''
Similarly,
Professor Sebert argued: "The traditional rules establish full
compensation as the maximum potential recovery for a contract
plaintiff, and they impose the primary risk of error in calculating
damages on the aggrieved plaintiff rather than upon the breacher; thus
they often preclude realizing full compensation,"' 10 2 and that, "[I]n the
past few years, there seems to be an increasingly widespread
recognition that traditional contract damage principles operate to create
a much more substantial risk of undercompensation than of
overcompensation."' 10 3 The idea that expectation damages give more
than optimal relief seems "tacitly to underlie the approach of classical
contract law" 10 4 and is apparent from such doctrines as certainty,
foreseeability, nonpecuniary loss, specific performance, punitive
damages, and liquidated damages. 10 5 Using these doctrines, "courts
often remove entire elements of claimed loss from the province of the
jury, '"106 leaving "many victims of contract breach (probably a
substantial majority)" not fully compensated. 107
I will now briefly examine the manner in which each of these
doctrines advances the "goal of limiting a promisee's recovery to [at
08
most] lost expectation." 1
1. Certainty
In order to be recoverable, damages must be proved with a
"necessary degree of certainty,"' 1 9 a rule that contributes to the law's
"slant[] in favor of awarding less than full damages." ' 1 0 In practice, this
101. E. Allan Farnsworth, Legal Remedies for Breach of Contract, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 1145,
1216 (1970).
102. Sebert, supra note 62, at 1567-68.
103. Id. at 1573; see also Sherwin, supra note 25, at 281 (arguing that "a variety of defects in
the damage remedy... belie th[e] assumption" that contract damages "compensate the promisee
for the value she placed on performance").
104. Eisenberg, supra note 45, at 572.
105. See generally Sebert, supra note 62, at 1566-67 (discussing the doctrines of certainty,
foreseeability, non-pecuniary loss, specific performance, punitive damages, and liquidated
damages); Orlando V. Da Silva, Comment, The Supreme Court of Canada's Lost Opportunity:
Semelhago v. Paramadevan, 23 QUEEN'S L.J. 475, 485 (1998) (Can.) (discussing Canadian
damages law).
106. Sebert, supra note 62, at 1567.
107. Id. at 1566.
108. Schwartz, supra note 46, at 369.
109. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 352 (1981) ("Damages are not recoverable
for loss beyond an amount that the evidence permits to be established with reasonable
certainty."); see also DiMatteo, supra note 4, at 648 (noting the difficulty in determining damages
with the necessary degree of certainty).
110. DiMatteo, supra note 4, at 648.
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doctrine amounts to a rule that courts will round down in calculating
damages.
2. Foreseeability
As with certainty, the foreseeability doctrine, exemplified by Hadley
v. Baxendale, is an example of the law's view of expectation as a ceiling
for contract recovery."'
Hadley, along with statutory enactments
relating to consequential damages, establishes a presumption against
awarding damages that follow only indirectly from breach. 1 2 As a
result, the recovery of consequential damages differs sharply from that
of full expectation damages. 1 13
Although some have criticized
114
Hadley's tendency to provide less than complete compensation,
others recognize that "[a] properly fashioned rule for consequential
damages... will not necessarily provide full compensation for all
economic loss, even if failure to recover that loss will leave the buyer in
a worse position than if the contract had been performed. Other policy
considerations... [may justify] limiting such recovery." 1 15
The
particular policy objective of Hadley is to induce the parties to share
information in a manner that diminishes total risk.I 6
Hadley has been "[d]escribed as 'a fixed star in the jurisprudential
firmament,' [and generally is recognized] as the definitive source for
determining when consequential damages may be recovered for breach
of contract." '1 17 Hadley established a two-prong test for recovery of
consequential damages: the damages must either (1) reasonably be
considered as "arising naturally" from breach-that is, arising
"according to the usual course of things"-or (2) reasonably be
assumed to have been considerations in the minds of both parties at the
1 18
time of contract formation.

111. Hadley v. Baxendale, 156 Eng. Rep. 145, 145 (Ex. Ch. 1854).
112. See Paul S. Turner, Consequential Damages: Hadley v. Baxendale Under the Uniform
Commercial Code, 54 SMU L. REv. 655, 661 (2001) (discussing such a presumption under
Hadley, as well as under section 1-106 of the Uniform Commercial Code).
113. See Eisenberg, supra note 45, at 578 (illustrating that, under Hadley, recovery of
consequential damages in contract law is narrower than in tort law).
114. See id. at 602 (arguing that, under Hadley, reasonably foreseeable costs are not
considered in awarding damages).
115. Diamond & Foss, supra note 2, at 678-79 (footnotes omitted).
116. Lawrence A. Cunningham, Cardozo and Posner:A Study in Contracts,36 WM. & MARY
L. REv. 1379, 1427-28 (1995).
117. Diamond & Foss, supra note 2, at 665 (footnotes omitted) (citing GRANT GILMORE, THE
DEATH OF CONTRACT 83 (1974)).
118. Hadley v. Baxendale, 156 Eng. Rep. 145, 151 (Ex. Ch. 1854).

582

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 35

In some constructions, Hadley's second prong has been taken to
mean that "consequential damages can be recovered only if, at the time
the contract was made, the [seller] had reason to foresee that the
consequential damages [were] the probable result of the breach." 1 19
Conceived this way, the two prongs are collapsed, with the first
120
becoming merely a special case of the second.
The Hadley test leads to a distinction between, on the one hand,
"general or direct damages [that (1)] flow from a given type of breach
without regard to the [promisee's] particular circumstances," 12 1 (2) can
be recovered even if unexpected, and (3) are usually "marketmeasured," 122 and, on the other hand, "special or consequential
damages," which (1) are circumstance-dependent and (2) "typically
consist of the difference between the profits the [promisee] actually
made in transactions with third persons and the profits [s]he would have
123
made if the seller had performed."
As applied, the Hadley doctrine imposes strict limits on recovery for
unexpected consequential loss. 12 4 Indeed, although some commentators
have framed Hadley as a "'foreseeability doctrine,' the principle as
traditionally formulated and applied cuts off most foreseeable
damages."' 12 5 Some courts "preclude even consequential damages [that]
the seller had reason to know the [plaintiff] would likely incur." 126
Other courts allow recovery only if the parties, as part of entering the
contract, entered a "tacit agreement" that the party in breach would
assume the loss if such loss should occur. 12 7 Thus, the Hadley doctrine
often cuts off recovery of consequential damages to damages that at the
time of making the contract (1) were reasonably foreseeable and/or (2)
28
the party in breach actually understood to be possible. 1

119. Eisenberg, supra note 45, at 566; see also Diamond & Foss, supra note 2, at 669 (citing
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 451(1), (2)(b) (1979)).
120. Eisenberg, supra note 45, at 565-66.
121. Id. at 565.
122. Diamond & Foss, supra note 2, at 667-68.
123. Eisenberg, supra note 45, at 565; see also Diamond & Foss, supra note 2, at 668 (stating
that consequential damages "result[] from the injured party's special circumstances").
124. Diamond & Foss, supra note 2, at 668; see also Eisenberg, supra note 45, at 567 (noting
that Hadley represents "[a]n extremely strict standard of foreseeability, which requires that the
damage not be merely foreseeable or reasonably foreseeable, but probable or even highly
probable").
125. Eisenberg, supra note 45, at 566 (footnotes omitted) (citing DAN B. DOBBS, HANDBOOK
ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES § 12.3 (1973)).
126. Id. at 570.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 567.
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This rule differs sharply from the tort rule for consequential
damages, 129 which dictates that once the defendant has breached a duty
to the plaintiff, the plaintiff can recover all damages foreseeably and
proximately caused by the tort; the tortfeasor is judged based on the
information she had at the time of the tort and not, as in contract law, at
the time of the creation of the duty. 130 Tort law applies a broad
foreseeability doctrine, "allowing the victim compensation for all but
extraordinary injuries."' 13 1 The tortfeasor is considered to "take[] the
plaintiff as he finds her,"' 132 meaning that liability will ensue even for
the tort, reasonably believed had
harms that the defendant, at the time of
13 3
occurrence.
of
probability
a very low
3. Nonpecuniary Loss
"Nonpecuniary losses, such as inconvenience, annoyance, and
emotional distress, although likely [to be] real in many situations, are
rarely recognized" in the law of contract remedies. 134 In an alternate
phrasing, this has been described as a tendency to "treat non-market
restricted
narrowly
except
"in
'nominal,"' 135
losses
as
13 6
circumstances."
As with the foreseeability requirement, this is in sharp contrast to the
tort doctrine, which generally allows recovery for emotional
damages. 137 In contract cases, courts traditionally have restricted
damages resulting from emotional distress to unusual situations, such as
(1) death and burial cases involving issues such as mishandling of a
corpse or providing of a defective casket; 13 8 (2) cases relating to the

129. See id. at 577-78 (noting that tort law determines damages under the principle of
proximate cause).
130. Id. at 580 ("The defendant will be liable for any type of damage which is reasonably
foreseeable as liable to happen even in the most unusual case .... (quoting Koufos v. C.
Czarnikow Ltd., [1969]1 App. Cas. 350, 384-85 (1967) (appeal taken from Eng.))).
131. Diamond & Foss, supra note 2, at 674.
132. Id. at 674-75.
133. See generally Eisenberg, supra note 45, at 577-80 (discussing the contrast between tort
law and contract law with regard to liability for consequential damages).
134. Sebert, supra note 62, at 1578 (footnote omitted).
135. Da Silva, supra note 105, at 502.
136. Sebert, supra note 62, at 1568.
137. Diamond & Foss, supra note 2, at 674-75 (noting that the broad tort foreseeability
doctrine is designed to assure that "only in the most exceptional cases will a victim's full
compensation be denied"); Sebert, supra note 62, at 1568 ("[C]ontract plaintiffs normally may
recover for emotional distress only infrequently and in narrowly restricted circumstances. This
limitation effectively denies the contract plaintiff access to the open-ended 'fund' of general
damages, pain and suffering, that is regularly available to the tort plaintiff." (footnotes omitted)).
138. Sebert, supra note 62, at 1584-85.
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breaching party's failure to promptly deliver a message that a close
friend or relative has died; 139 (3) cases where the breach was necessarily
accompanied by "public embarrassment or humiliation of the plaintiff,
such as unjustified ejection of the plaintiff from a hotel, restaurant, or
other public place"; 140 and (4) cases where the breach directly impacts
the injured party's health, such as cases of improperly performed
medical procedures. 141
Courts have sought to explain the doctrine of nonpecuniary loss
alternatively in terms of the foreseeability doctrine 142 and the certainty
requirement. 143 However, as neither of these explanations account fully
for the case law, the doctrine barring recovery of nonpecuniary loss
merits inclusion as a distinct example of the law's lack of commitment
144 I
to the goal of awarding contract plaintiffs their full expectation.
will examine the purported foreseeability and certainty explanations in
turn.
The standard Hadley foreseeability doctrine cannot explain the fact
that nonpecuniary losses generally are discounted even where such
losses could be expected to occur in the great preponderance of cases. It
would not be
so unusual to expect emotional distress to arise from a botched home
remodeling job, from a defective automobile that continually [breaks]
down and [has] to be repaired, from the unjustified termination of
disability insurance payments, from an attorney's failure to disclose a
substantial lien on residential property that a plaintiff had contracted to
purchase, or from the unjustified cancellation of a business
opportunity on which a plaintiff had substantially relied[.] Yet in
most cases courts have quickly, and without closely examining the
specific facts, concluded that emotional
distress could not be a
14 5
foreseeable consequence of breach.
To assert foreseeability as the basis of the nonpecuniary loss doctrine,
one must at least conclude that courts apply a different, and far stricter,
foreseeability standard to nonpecuniary losses than to those losses that
146
are purely economic in nature.

139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

Id. at
Id.
Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id. at

1585.

1586.
1587-88.
1586-87.
1587.
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The standard certainty doctrine also fails to explain the case law on
nonpecuniary loss. 147 Clearly, any valuation of noneconomic losses
will be uncertain, but there is no reason to think that the estimation can
be any more certain in the few cases in which contract law has
traditionally provided compensation for nonpecuniary loss. 148 If courts
are willing to open up the possibility of inaccurate assessment in cases
that fall under the traditional exceptions to the prohibition against
recovery of noneconomic damages, then something other than the
certainty requirement must be invoked to explain why the courts are
unwilling to be similarly generous in other cases.
4. Specific Performance
Specific performance is the quintessential full-expectation remedy.
Other than the time delay involved in going to court and forcing
performance, the plaintiff receives actual performance, exactly that for
which she bargained. And yet courts strongly favor denying specific
performance in favor of monetary damages, which I have shown tend
toward compensation below expectation.1 49 As Professor Schwartz has
pointed out, the adoption of damages rather than specific performance
as the default remedy reflects, among other factors, courts' "inarticulate
150
reluctance to pursue the compensation goal fully."
The law of contract remedies is characterized by a "remedial
hierarchy" that prefers damages to specific performance. 15 1 Courts
generally will award specific performance only when, in addition to
other restrictions, damages are inadequate 15 2 as a "substitute for the
1 53
promised performance."

147. See id. at 1587-88.
The certainty ground, however, fails to provide a satisfactory explanation because
uncertainties about the measurement and even the existence of emotional distress are
likely to be similar in both situations in which case law has traditionally permitted
recovery for emotional distress and those in which this recovery is normally denied.
Id.
148. Id.
149. See, e.g., supra notes 100-08 and accompanying text (reviewing commentary that finds
contract law damages result in plaintiffs receiving less than full compensation).
150. Alan Schwartz, The Casefor Specific Performance, 89 YALE L.J. 271, 274 (1979).
151. Jessica Freiheit, The Breakdown of Hierarchy: Damages at Law Versus Damages in
Equity, 27 MANITOBA L.J. 185, 186 (2000).
152. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 359(1) (1981).
153. 3 FARNSWORTH, supra note 2, § 12.6, at 174; see also Leahy, supra note 8, at 533
(stating that "the underlying rule is that specific performance will not be granted if legal damages
are adequate").
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Although "[t]here is no general formula for determining when"
monetary damages are inadequate, 154 specific performance will not
necessarily be available just because "expectation damages pose a
significant risk of undercompensat[ing the plaintiff].' 155 Adequacy is
judged based on the totality of the circumstances of the contract, 156 with
courts looking to factors such as uncertainty in the appropriate damage
amount, 157 and any obstacles to the plaintiffs use of a money award to
obtaining adequate substitute performance. 15 8 Prototypical cases for
specific performance include contracts involving "heirlooms, family
treasures and works of art that induce a strong sentimental
attachment." 15 9 In cases such as these, specific performance is justified
because damages, calculated pursuant to the limiting doctrines of
certainty, foreseeability, and the prohibition against recovering
noneconomic loss, may be nominal and expose the plaintiff to risk of
60
dramatic undercompensation.1
"In addition to the adequacy test, a number of other limitations
restrict the availability of specific performance." 16 1 These include (1) a
requirement of extra clarity in the contract terms; (2) a rule against
awarding specific performance that would entail too much judicial
supervision; (3) a requirement that the injured party be willing and able
to make full and complete return performance; 162 (4) a doctrine of
balancing the value of the injured party's loss against the breaching
party's cost of compliance; 16 3 and (5) the court's equitable power (not
extended to cases involving purely monetary damages) to second-guess
the parties by looking into the price' 64 and the fairness of the
16 6
contract, 16 5 and to weigh other public-policy considerations.
154. Kennedy, supra note 6, at 648; see Douglas Laycock, The Death of the Irreparable
Injury Rule, 103 HARV. L. REV. 687, 691 (1990) ("Courts have escaped the [adequacy] rule by
defining adequacy in such a way that damages are never an adequate substitute for plaintiff's
loss.").
155. 3 FARNSWORTH, supra note 2, § 12.20a, at 356.
156. Id. § 12.6, at 176 (citing U.C.C. § 2-716 cmt. 2).
157. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 360(a).
158. Id. § 360(b); see Kennedy, supra note 6, at 630 (discussing the difficulty in finding a
suitable substitute); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 360 cmt. c (discussing
the doctrine relating to the "[d]ifficulty of obtaining [a] substitute").
159. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 360 cmt. b.
160. 3 FARNSWORTH, supra note 2, § 12.6, at 174-77.
161. Id. § 12.7, at 179.
162. Id. § 12.7, at 180-83.
163. Standen, supra note 3, at 170.
164. Id.
165. 3 FARNSWORTH, supra note 2, § 12.7, at 185.
166. Id. § 12.7, at 187.
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For the present purposes, the details of these limitations on specific
performance are not important. What is important is that these
limitations are further examples of the law's willingness to set recovery
below expectation whenever other policy issues complicate the picture.
In the next section, I demonstrate that the law shows far greater
reticence to deviate upward from the expectation measure, refusing to
tolerate supercompensation even when agreement of the parties and/or
deterrence goals appear to favor it.
C. DoctrinalBarriersAgainst Supercompensation
1. Punitive Damages
Under prevailing law, punitive damages are not allowed in breach of
contract cases. 167
This rule has been viewed as reflecting a
"countervailing corollary to the principle of full compensation: Do not
overcompensate the victim of contract breach." 168 "Damages are
designed [only] to compensate for an established loss and not to provide
a gratuitous benefit to the aggrieved party ....
,,169 This rule on
punitive damages is justified on the ground that "excessive liability...
may discourage valuable commercial and economic activity and thus
create an undesirable barrier to the efficient reallocation of
170
resources."
There exists only one well-established exception to the rule against
awarding punitive damages: when the "conduct constituting the breach
is also a tort for which punitive damages are recoverable." 17 1 Inother
words, the law of contract traditionally does not allow punitive
damages. Tort law, on the other hand, does, and the mere fact that a tort
happens to involve a breach of contract does not insulate the tortfeasor
by locking the plaintiff into the limits of contract remedies.
Some have argued for supplementing the "independent tort"
exception by expanding contract law's application of punitive damages,
especially to cases involving malicious behavior by the breaching
167. William S. Dodge, The Casefor Punitive Damages in Contracts,48 DUKE L.J. 629, 630
(1999) (observing that "[t]raditionally, punitive damages have not been available for breach of
contract."); Sebert, supra note 62, at 1569 (noting that "[t]raditionally, punitive damages were
said never to be available in contract actions."); Amy A. Kirby, Note, Punitive Damages in
Contract Actions: The Tension Between the United Nations Convention on Contractsfor the
InternationalSale of Goods and U.S. Law, 16 J.L. & COM. 215, 215 (1997) (stating that "punitive
damages have been technically forbidden in breach of contract actions").
168. Sebert, supra note 62, at 1566.
169. Da Silva, supra note 105, at 496 (discussing Canadian law).
170. Sebert, supra note 62, at 1566.
171. Id. at 1569.
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party. 172 These efforts have been largely unsuccessful, and although
some jurisdictions now permit punitive contract damages in a narrowly
defined set of cases involving promissory fraud, 17 3 bad-faith denials of
insurance claims, 17 4 and cases in which "'elements of fraud, malice,
gross negligence or oppression mingle in the controversy'," 175 the rule
prohibiting punitive damages in breach-of-contract cases remains
secure.
2. Liquidated Damages
Not only does the law of contract damages disallow judicially
imposed supercompensatory remedies but also it refuses to enforce
contract terms in which the parties appear to have bargained for and, by
mutual consent, agreed upon such remedies. When the parties have
entered a contract stipulating their own damage remedy, courts will
enforce that remedy only if the specified sum does not exceed "the harm
that the promisee could reasonably expect [ex ante] to suffer from
176
breach or ...the actual harm that breach turned out to cause."
Whenever the amount specified in the damages clause exceeds either of
these amounts, it constitutes a windfall that "cannot be justified under
the just compensation principle that underlies common law contract
damages"' 17 7 and "mandates that the non-breaching party... receive
[only] expectation damages"1 78-although,
as demonstrated in Part
IV.B, expectation damages often provide substantially less than true
expectation.
The Ohio Supreme Court has articulated this rule "prevent[ing
parties] from contracting for a supercompensatory remedy" 17 9 as
follows: "reasonable compensation for actual damages is the legitimate
objective of ...liquidated damages provisions and where the amount
specified is manifestly inequitable and unrealistic, courts will ordinarily
180
regard it as a penalty."'

172. See Schwartz, supra note 46, at 396 (stating that "promisors sometimes behave
maliciously [and] there is a plausible case for punitive damages when [this behavior] occurs").
173. See Sebert, supra note 62, at 1607-13.
174. Schwartz, supra note 46, at 371-72; Sebert, supra note 62, at 1613-19.
175. Hibschman Pontiac, Inc. v. Batchelor, 362 N.E.2d 845, 847 (Ind. 1977) (quoting Vernon
Fire & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Sharp, 349 N.E.2d 173, 180 (Ind. 1976)).
176. Schwartz, supra note 46, at 369. See generally DiMatteo, supra note 4, at 656-63
(discussing the law of liquidated damages).
177. DiMatteo, supra note 4, at 642-43.
178. Id. at 647.
179. Schwartz, supra note 46, at 369.
180. Samson Sales, Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 465 N.E.2d 392, 393-94 (Ohio 1984).
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The prohibition against bargained-for supercompensatory remedies is
demonstrated further by the "no injury defense," which applies to
breaches of contracts containing liquidated-damages clauses.
The
defense bars recovery under a liquidated-damages clause in cases where
18 1
the plaintiff suffered no actual injury from the breach.
V. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEM OF SUPERCOMPENSATION
THROUGH OPPORTUNISTIC ELECTION BETWEEN SPECIFIC
PERFORMANCE AND DAMAGES

A. The TraditionalEquitableApproach
Consistent with the "equitable impulse to deter plaintiff
overcompensation,"' 182 some courts have applied the equitable doctrine
of laches to disallow specific performance in cases characterized by
opportunistic delay of election. Laches allows judges to deny claims for
specific performance on the ground that the injured party has engaged in
unreasonable delay that she knew or should have known would result in
harm to the breaching party. 183 This reflects the view that "equity aids
the vigilant not they who slumber on their rights."' 184 Although this
approach allows judicial intervention in some cases of opportunistic
delay of election, the doctrine is only effective in egregious cases,
where the facts cry out that opportunism was a factor.
In Gaglione v. Cardi,185 for example, the Rhode Island Supreme
Court invoked laches to justify the denial of specific relief where the
plaintiff had waited approximately six years before initiating a suit for
specific performance, during which time the subject property had
increased in value at least five fold, from $20,000 to "in excess of
$100,000. ' ' 186 It was not the six-year delay alone that caused the court
to deny specific performance, as the court noted that "the mere lapse of
time does not constitute laches." 187 Nonetheless, because the delay was
"unexplained and inexcusable" and had the effect of "visiting prejudice"
upon the defendant, it "operate[d] as an estoppel to the assertion of' the
188
plaintiff's right to equitable relief.

181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.

DiMatteo, supra note 4, at 643.
Ayres & Madison, supra note 42, at 84.
Kennedy, supra note 6, at 626.
Id. at 621-22.
Gaglione v. Cardi, 388 A.2d 361 (R.I. 1978).
Id. at 364-65.
Id. at 364.
Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
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Crawford v. Workman 18 9 presents another example where a court
applied laches
to
forestall
the
plaintiff from obtaining
supercompensation through delayed election of a remedy. In this case,
the plaintiff, Crawford, sued for specific performance of a contract
granting him "coal, oil, gas, and other mineral" rights to an
approximately 600-acre tract of land. 190 The plaintiff initiated suit in
March 1906, after five years of delay. In the intervening time, the
expansion of the railroads had vastly increased the practicality of
transporting resources away from the land and caused the value of the
land's mineral rights to increase "perhaps twentyfold."' 19 1 The court
noted that Crawford offered no excuse for his delay and conjectured that
it was his "intent to await events, and if railroads should head in [the]
direction [of the tract of land] insist upon the contract, [but] otherwise
not." 192 The court then paraphrased Pomeroy on Specific Performance
for the proposition that "where a vendee delays in order that he may
speculate upon the chances ...that through a rise in value his gain may
be assured, and then, when he is thus certain that it will be a fortunate
speculation, sues for a conveyance, equity may refuse to grant him
193
relief."
Finally, in Hymel v. Old Homestead Inc., 194 the court found that the
plaintiffs were not entitled to specific performance of an October 1927
contract where they had waited to initiate suit until August 1958195 and
had "exhibited no interest in the contract whatever and offered no
excuse for their lack thereof' during the intervening twenty-five
years. 19 6 The court noted that the "[p]laintiffs' unreasonable delay in
filing ... suit after the [property] in question [had] substantially
increased in value... justif[ied] and require[d] a denial" of the
19 7
plaintiffs' right to specific performance.
As these cases reflect, laches gives courts some power to prevent
plaintiff overcompensation in cases of opportunistic delay in electing a
remedy. The laches approach, however, has two serious limitations.
First, it requires that the element of opportunism be clearly apparent
from the facts of the case. A plaintiff will only be estopped from
189.
190.
191.
192.

Crawford v. Workman, 61 S.E. 319 (W. Va. 1908).
Id. at 319.
Id. at 321.
Id.

193.

Id. (citing section 407 of Pomeroy on Specific Performance).

194.
195.
196.
197.

Hymel v. Old Homestead Inc., 135 So. 2d 685 (La. Ct. App. 1961).
Id. at 686.
Id. at 687.
Id.
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asserting an otherwise legitimate equitable claim in situations "where
the facts calling for [estoppel] and the wrong to be prevented are both
unquestionable." 198 As the case discussions above demonstrate, this
means that laches will be invoked only in cases of extended delay,
dramatic increase in value, or both. In Gaglione, the subject property
increased in value more than five fold. 199 In Crawford, the court
estimated the increase at twenty fold.20 0 These facts make application
of laches straightforward. But what about cases where the value has
increased twenty percent or fifty percent? Such an increase would
probably be enough to alter the plaintiff's election of remedy, but would
a court find it sufficient to invoke laches?
Second, the laches approach requires that the court engage in a trial
within a trial. Before denying specific relief, a court will have to hear
evidence and make findings concerning the plaintiff's excuse for her
delay and changes that have occurred in the land market. If the plaintiff
can assert a rational, non-opportunistic justification for her late election
of a remedy, she may succeed in muddying the issue enough that the
court will be reluctant to deny her right to specific relief. In addition to
the added cost that such a trial within a trial produces, it also must
inevitably lead to judicial error and the denial of specific relief to certain
individuals whose delay was not motivated by opportunism.
These obstacles can be overcome, however, by an alternative
approach to the problem of supercompensation: alter the election of
remedies rule so that plaintiffs must elect early.
B. ProposedRule: Force Plaintiffs To Elect Early
Plaintiffs should be required to make the election between damages
and specific performance early, in some cases even before initiating the
litigation. The current rule, which allows election "even at an advanced
stage of the action," 20 1 allows plaintiffs to plead in the alternative and
then to derive economic advantage from tactically abandoning one
remedy or the other. 20 2 Providing plaintiffs the resultant systematic
windfall cannot be justified in terms of any of the underlying policy
reasons for creating an entitlement to specific relief. In identifying
those policy considerations, I will once again start by asking the

198. Kennedy, supra note 6, at 624.
199. Gaglione v. Cardi, 388 A.2d 361, 364-65 (R.I. 1978).
200. Crawford v. Workman, 61 S.E. 319, 321 (W. Va. 1908).
201.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 378 cmt. a (1981).

202. Clark, supra note 39, at 609 (arguing for a general rule against a plaintiffs gain through
the tactical abandonment of a claim for specific relief).
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question, what remedy would contracting parties likely agree upon if,
costless, and second, courts did not secondfirst, the negotiations were
20 3
guess their contracts?
In a world of zero negotiation costs, parties would agree upon a
remedy of specific performance only in those cases where the cost to
the buyer of bearing the risk of being undercompensated by monetary
damages is greater than the cost to the seller of bearing the risk that she
will be forced to perform on the contract. 20 4 As shown in Part IV, the
traditional rules for calculating expectation damages produce risk of
undercompensation in a great many cases. This undercompensation
will be most severe in cases where the object contracted for is
unique, 2°5 such that no true substitute can be obtained easily, 20 6 and a
significant fraction of the plaintiff's loss will be impossible to prove
with adequate certainty. 20 7 In cases of land contracts, in particular,
"awarding specific performance 'as a matter of course,' forestalls the
systematic under-compensation of consumer purchasers" who otherwise

would see their nonpecuniary loss based on their special connection to
the bargained-for
perspective, on the
out-of-pocket loss
may, for example,

From the seller's
land go unrecognized. 20 8
never
be
forced to take an
other hand, the seller will
in order to perform a sale-of-land contract-as she
if the contract were for the erection of a building.

203. In practice, courts often do second-guess the parties' agreement, especially when the
parties agree upon specific performance as a remedy. This fact makes it all the more important to
use the zero negotiation cost model to evaluate the legal rule because the parties' inability to
contract out of an inefficient default term will mean that contracts are undertaken on less than the
most mutually beneficial terms and will both (1) decrease the average per-transaction gains from
trade and (2) lower the total level of promissory activity.
204. See Kennedy, supra note 6, at 630. Kennedy argues that parties engaged in free
negotiation would likely agree upon the uniqueness test:
From a functional perspective, the adequacy test essentially reaches the same result the
parties probably would have bargained for if bargaining for a remedy was possible.
For example, a person buying something unique would probably have bargained for
specific performance, but a person buying widgets would probably have bargained for
(and would probably prefer) damages.
Id.; see also Yorio, supra note 70, at 1377 (outlining an argument that the uniqueness test
enhances efficiency).
205. See Yorio, supra note 70, at 1377.
206. Muris, supra note 72, at 1056-57 (arguing that in the absence of substitutes, courts will
not devote sufficient resources to adequately determine damages); Yorio, supra note 70, at 1379.
207. See Yorio, supra note 70, at 1379 ("Promisees of unique goods usually care very much
about obtaining a specific performance clause .. . because it may be difficult, or impossible, to
buy a satisfactory substitute.").
208. Da Silva, supra note 105, at 497 (discussing Canadian law).
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The court can simply transfer ownership of the land by its own
decree,20 9 thereby exposing the seller only to minimal risk.
With costless negotiation, the parties would never agree on a remedy
that allowed the buyer the option to choose between damages and
specific performance. This can be seen by recognizing that specific
performance provides exactly expectation and, to the extent that any
additional elective power given to the buyer makes the buyer better off,
that elective power pushes the remedy over the threshold and into the
supercompensatory domain. As demonstrated in Part III.B, parties
engaged in costless negotiation would never choose supercompensation.
However, the parties would not agree upon specific performance as a
remedy in all sale-of-land contracts. In some cases, the buyer's interest
in the piece of land will be unrelated to the land's unique characteristics.
As the Canadian Supreme Court noted in Semelhago, due to "the
progress of modem real estate development. . . [r]esidential, business
and industrial properties are all mass produced much in the same way as
other consumer products. If a deal falls through for one property,
another is frequently, though not always, readily available." 2 10 In such
cases, the buyer bears little risk of dramatic undercompensation if
forced to rely on monetary damages, thus making bargaining for a
remedy of specific performance unlikely.
The current legal rule allows election between monetary damages and
specific relief because each remedy best fits some subset of the cases,
although the remedy of election itself fits no cases. This may balance
interests appropriately by helping to ensure that a remedy somewhere
nearby the efficient remedy is available in all cases.
Allowing
substantial delay before the election, however, does nothing to advance
the relevant interests. In cases where specific performance is the ex
ante efficient remedy, it is so because the buyer, at the time of
contracting, values the land at above market price because of nonmonetary factors that leave the buyer vulnerable to severe
undercompensation by monetary damages. In these cases, the buyer is
aware of her idiosyncratic valuation at the time of contracting and will
certainly be aware of it at the time of breach. The buyer needs no
additional information before deciding which remedy to pursue, and
thus, no delay in making the election should be tolerated. Forcing the
plaintiff to elect early eliminates the supercompensation that results

209. 3 FARNSWORTH, supra note 2, § 12.4, at 765.
210. Semelhago v. Paramadevan [1996] 2 S.C.R. 415, 428 (Can.), available at http://
www.lexum.umontreal.ca/csc-scc/en/pub/1996/vol2/htmlI996scr2_0415.htm
(last visited Jan.
23, 2004).
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from opportunistically delayed election, thereby pushing the actual
remedy closer to the efficient one.
Thus, in cases of breach of land-sale contracts, plaintiffs should be
forced to elect between damages and specific performance before
having a chance to gauge the market. At the latest, election should be
required upon the filing of the litigation. Ideally, election should take
place even earlier, perhaps through a simple declaratory filing that the
plaintiff is required to make within a short time of the breach in order to
retain her right to specific performance.
This argument does not naturally extend beyond land-sale contract
cases to other cases in which the plaintiff has access to specific
performance. In other cases, specific performance is not awarded as a
matter of course, and plaintiffs can receive specific performance only by
proving the inadequacy of monetary relief. Requiring early election
would be meaningless in cases where the plaintiff simply could decline
to find
to submit evidence of uniqueness, which would lead the 2court
11
damages.
monetary
award
and
specific relief inappropriate
VI. CONCLUSION

This Article has been roughly syllogistic in structure: major
premise-that under the current, lenient election of remedies rule,
plaintiff buyers suing for breach of land-sale contracts are afforded, on
average, a supercompensatory remedy; 2 12 minor premise-that the law
should be arranged so as to never give a supercompensatory remedy to
contract plaintiffs; 2 13 conclusion-that the current election of remedies
rule should be altered. Part V argues that the election of remedies rule
should be changed, at least as applied to land-sale contract breaches,
and offers a suggestion for how to change it.
Phrased in ex post terms, it may sound implausible that plaintiffs
would actually seek supercompensation by taking advantage of the
extended deadline before electing between monetary damages and
specific performance. Taking the ex ante perspective, however, it
seems quite likely that the individual plaintiff, most likely a repeat
player in the real estate market who has watched the market for land rise

211. A rule denying all relief in cases where the plaintiff asserts a right to specific
performance and then fails to make the necessary proof should be avoided for the chilling effect it
would have on individuals legitimately seeking specific relief in cases in which their entitlement
is less than crystal clear.
212. See supra Part II.
213. See supra Parts HI-IV.

20041

Against Supercompensation

or fall, would have the sense to elect a remedy that will maximize her
return.
The undesirability of supercompensatory remedies is apparent from
both the theoretical and the doctrinal perspectives. The economic
principles of risk spreading, efficient breach, and information cost argue
that supercompensatory remedies are inefficient in that parties engaged
in costless negotiation would never agree on them. Remedies lower
than expectation, however, may be efficient, depending on the parties'
comparative costs of bearing risk. This view is reflected perfectly in the
doctrine and commentary of contract damages.
The law shows
substantial willingness to award compensation equal to less than
expectation, while it will not tolerate supercompensation, even where
the parties explicitly agree to it in the contract.
Finally, it is relatively easy to correct the problem of
supercompensation of land-contract plaintiffs. By shortening the
window of time within which land-contract plaintiffs are required to
elect
between
specific
performance
and
damages,
the
supercompensation can be eliminated without compromising any of the
policy goals advanced by allowing the election in the first place.
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APPENDIX 1
In order to prove the conclusion reached intuitively in Part III.A,
consider a supercompensatory damage remedy, di, such that
d, = (e + r - p, + a,) where a, > 0. In this circumstance, phrased in
terms of figure 2 supra, the buyer's (B's) performance point, (e - p), is
to the left of her breach point, (d, - r) = (e -p, + a,).
When the damage measure equals di, and the price equals Pl,
Equation 1:
E(UB ) = L(UB (e - p 1 )) + (1- L)(UB (e - pl + a,)).
Holding e as a constant, and assuming that both p and a are variable,
small changes in p and a will affect E(UB) as follows:
Equation 2:
dE(UB)=

-dp

B (e

-P)

Ne - p))

(

daUB(e- p, +a) +daaUB(e+(e-p+-a)

p +a,)

a(e-p+)

)

Because of the positive slope and downward curvature of B's utility
function,
0<

A =

aUB

+

(e - p,
a1,)
(e-p
+a)<

UB(e
U

p+ + a)

(e - p

a)

B (e - Pl )
U(e-p)

alU

and M =

As a shorthand, let

JUe
(e -p)
U
(e - p)

,where v > 1.

Assume that B is considering an alteration to the contract in which
both p and a decrease, according to the relationship, xdp = da, where
x > 0. Substitution simplifies Equation 2 into

dE(UB) = L(- dpvA) + (1- L)(- dpA + dpxA).
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B has an incentive to accept any alteration to the contract as long as
dE(UB) > 0. Thus, the values of x for which B has an incentive to
accept a reduction in the price can be determined as follows:

0 < L(- dpvA) + (1- L)(- dpA + dpxA)
.. -(1- L)(- dpA + dpxA) < L(- vdpA)
dp <0,0< A
.'. -(I - L)(x - 1) > -Lv
L<I
.'.l-L>0
Lv
1-L
Thus, B has an incentive to accept any offered diminution in price as
dcx
Lv + 1.
<
long as the changes in p and a are small, and dp
1-L
As the following analysis demonstrates, whenever the contract
provides for supercompensatory damages, the seller, S, will be willing
to accept a price diminution fitting this description. When the damage
measure is d1 , the seller, S, has the following utility function:
Equation 3:
E(Us ) = L(Us (p - c)) + (1 - L)(U s (-d, - c))
= L(Us (p, - c)) + (1 - L)(U s (p - e - r - a, - c)).
Thus, Equation 4:
dE(Us) = Ldp aUs(p -c)
U s (p, - e- r - a - c) _ da
+( L)
+ (1- Ldp-(p-e-r--c)

c
-(p-e-r-a-c)

Stated in terms of figure 3 supra, while the damage remedy is di, S's
performance point, (pi - c), is to the right of her breach point, (p, - e - r

.u~,--ra
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-a, - c). Due to the upward slope and downward curvature of S's utility
aUs(p 1-e-r-cx 1-c)
1-C) <Us(P
function, 0 <
a(p - e - r - o - c)
- c)
_(p

As a shorthand, D =

qD =

U s (p

,- 0
a(p -c)

and

aUs (PI -e- r - a - c)
q (p - e - r - a- c) , where q >1.

S considers an alteration to the contract where dp < 0, da < 0,
ydp = da, and y> 0. Substitution causes Equation 4 to simplify into
dE(Us) = L(dpD)+ (1- L)(qdpD - qydpD).
S has an incentive to accept any alteration to the damage remedy for
which dE(Us ) > 0. The situations under which dE(Us ) > 0 can be
determined are as follows:
0 < L(dpD) + (1- L)(qdpD - qydpD)
.'.-(1- L)(qdpD - qydpD) < L(dpD)
D > 0, dp <0, (1- L) > 0
.- (1-L)(q -qy) > L
(q -qy) < - L
I-L
1-L
q>0
y>-

L
+1.
q(1 - L)

Thus, S has an incentive to accept any alteration to the contract such
that
>
+ 1.
dp

q(1- L)

Although the interests of S and B are clearly adverse (i.e., B wants dp
to be of as much greater magnitude than da as possible, while S wants
the opposite), supercompensatory remedies will always result in an
overlapping area wherein both would profit from a reduction in both
price and damage remedy. This is so because any alteration in the d and
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L
<da <Lv + I will benefit both S and B.
q(1 - L)
dp 1 - L
Such a value must exist because q > 1 and v > 1.
Therefore, all contracts containing supercompensatory damage
remedies are inefficient, at least from a risk-spreading perspective,
because there will always exist mutually beneficial alterations that
decrease the damage remedy.
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APPENDIX 2
AN EXAMPLE OF THE DAMAGE MEASURE MAKING AN
INFORMATION-GATHERING EXPENDITURE UNNECESSARY

Suppose that B is considering buying a home. B has two options: to
buy from a large real-estate company that she knows never breaches a
contract, or to buy from S, a local landlord, who may or may not breach.
S is asking $130,000 for a house that is worth $150,000 to B. If B and S
enter a contract, and that contract is performed, B will receive a surplus
of $20,000. The real-estate company is selling another house that B
values at $150,000, but the company is asking $143,000. If B enters
that contract she will receive a surplus $7000. B knows that her reliance
will be zero, and for initial consideration, the damage measure is zero.
L, however, is uncertain. From her experience in real estate, B knows
that there are only two kinds of local landlords: reliable ones, for whom
L = .9, and unreliable ones, for whom L = .4. Before investing in
research, B knows that S falls into one of these two groups, each with .5
probability. Assume that by expending $500 worth of her time to
research S's history, B can determine which kind of landlord S is.
Consistent with the general concave shape discussed in Part III.A, B
has a utility function such that UB (x) = ln(0

500

+ 10),

where x denotes the monetary value B places on what she receives. B's
expected utility from a purchase from the local landlord is calculated as
follows:
E(UB)

=

L(UB (e - p)) + (1 - L)(UB (d - r))

e =150000
p = 130000
d =0
r=0
20000
E(UB) = L(ln(
500

+ 10)) + (1 - L)(ln(10)).

Before expending resources on researching S's past history, B knows
that L equals either .9 or .4, each with 50% chance. Under these
circumstances of uncertainty, B's valuation of the contract is:
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[ 91n( 20000
500 +10 )+. lln(10)]
1 + 1.41n(
500 +10 +.61n(10)
I 2(U
20000

=1(3.75)+2(2.94)
2
2

=

3.35.

That is, while B is uncertain whether S is reliable or unreliable, B's
expected utility from the contract is 3.35 (the equivalent of $9251 given
with certainty). 2 14 If, on the other hand, B knew S's status, then B's
expected utility from the contract would be 3.75 (the equivalent of
$16,261 given with certainty) if S were reliable and 2.94 (the equivalent
of $4458 given with certainty) if S were unreliable.
When the damage measure is set at zero, B's proper strategy is to
invest the $500 dollars worth of effort necessary to determine S's type
and then enter the contract only if S is reliable. If S is unreliable, then B
will buy from the real-estate company and receive a total surplus
equivalent to ($7000 - $500). By adopting this strategy,
E(U,) = I 91n 20000-500 +
-500 +10 + I in 7000-500 +10
BI 2 L.n

500

(500

2

500

= -(3.72) +1(3.14) = 3.43.

2
2
This is equal to the equivalent of $10,438 given with certainty. Thus,
even after the $500 dollar expenditure is subtracted, B's research
increases her valuation of the contract by $1187.
This $500 expenditure, however, would be unnecessary if the damage
measure were set at expectation, rather than at zero. Under the
expectation measure, B's expected utility from the contract would not
depend on L, but would be
E(UB) = Ln 150000 -130000
+10 (1-L)ln5000-130000 +10
5 00 +500
=ln( 150000 -130000+1
3..
500
+0=.1
-~~

214. The dollar equivalent of a utility value can be easily calculated using an equation derived
from B's utility function: U8 = ln(-x + 10) => 500(eu, - 10) = x.
500

602
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This translates into a cash-equivalent valuation of $20,000 given with
certainty. Clearly this model does not take into account minor price
adjustments that the seller would make to respond to a higher damage
remedy. The point is simply that, because the expectation measure of
damages makes B indifferent as to L, it eliminates the need for B to
make expenditures to determine L's true value.

